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Abstract
This note discusses the generational incidence of consumption taxes in an OLG framework.
The objective is to highlight the channels through which an increase in, e.g., a VAT redistributes
income across generations. It turns out that with labor supply exogenous VAT incidence is very
similar to the impact of a PAYG pension system or government debt.
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the generational incidence
of consumption taxes. First, I employ in section 2 a version of Diamond’s (1965) two-period overlap-
ping generations model to identify the impact of consumption taxes on the generational distribution
of economic welfare. Next, I relate the inter-cohort redistribution effects to the macro-economic
impact using a general equilibrium, simulation model embodying the Blanchard-Yaari-Weil OLG
structure. This is done in section 3, while section 4 summarizes the findings.
2 Consumption taxes in the Diamond-model
Below I identify the generational impact of consumption taxes. For expositional
simplest possible model: The two-period, exogenous labor Diamond-model with
specific, non-distortive income transfers as the only instruments available to the
ease, I employ the
the VAT and 
fiscal authority. In
the standard notation of the Diamond-model, consider the lifetime budget constraint of the young
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Equations (5) and (7) immediately reveal the incidence of the consumption tax: It is a proportional
tax on lifetime resources. Occasionally, the VAT is described as being regressive, because those who
consume a large fraction of their income pay a relatively large part of it in  While this is
obviously true in an annual accounting sense, from a lifetime incidence perspective, which is the
appropriate one in an intertemporal setting, the VAT is a proportional tax. The point is that those
who save will eventually pay consumption taxes on their savings (plus return) once they liquidate
their wealth. The net incidence of the consumption tax then depends on the incidence of the tax
instrument used to rebate consumption tax revenue relative to a proportional tax on lifetime income.
Before turning to this problem, it is useful to highlight the key factors affecting individual savings
by rewriting (6) using
That is,  represents the present value of labor income accruing to the young at time  while 
is its growth rate. Defining similarly
yields upon substitution in (6)
 + 
Accordingly, savings in period  depend on the present value of lifetime resources of the young
generation i.e.  and as well as the distribution of income flows across the two periods of
life. Given the slope parameters,  and increasing the wealth of the young induces them to
save more, provided savings are initially positive. Increasing the growth of income over the lifecycle,
keeping the present values unchanged, leads to lower savings as the household receives less income
in the first period of life and more in the last. To sustain the desired intertemporal consumption
profile, which is given by  savings are reduced.
I now piece together the model of the consumer sector by collecting the equations characteriz-
ing the behavior of the period  young and old, respectively, and adding the government budget
constraint linking lump sum transfers to consumption tax revenue. Consumption of the young is
r
while the members of the old generation consume their savings, inclusive of the accrued return, plus
total labor income in period  that is
 +  =  +  +  + (12)
 e.g., Ministry of Finance  page 285.
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Consumption tax incidence: Illustrative simulations
In the model used in the previous section, consumption taxes lead to purely redistributive effects
as there are no distortions in the model. In this section, I seek to quantify the dynamic impact of
consumption taxes using a simulation model featuring endogenous labor supply and a wide range
of tax instruments. These features imply that a change in the rate of VAT will interact with the
other taxes deployed by the government. To illustrate the sensitivity of the outcome with respect
to revenue recycling, I will consider two alternative ways of securing intertemporal budget balance.
In the first case, I assume that budget balance is obtained period by period through the adjustment
of age independent lump sum transfers. In the second scenario, the lump sum income subsidy is
changed only once, while public debt absorbs the intertemporal variations in tax revenue. I also
contrast endogenous versus fixed labor supply in order to more accurately identify the impact of
incentive effects.
The simulation model features standard building blocks joined together in a small, open econ-
omy framework. The consumer side embodies the Blanchard-Yaari-Weil OLG structure, and the
individual household chooses labor supply, consumption and savings so as to maximize expected
lifetime utility. Firms are competitive and employ capital services and labor in order to produce a
domestic good, which is perfectly substitutable with foreign production. Finally, I assume perfect
mobility of financial assets between the home and foreign economies, while physical capital mobility
is hampered by installation costs in the short run.
In each of the experiments reported below, the VAT rate is raised by 5 percentage points and
the proceeds are used to increase non-distortionary income transfers to households.
Endogenous labor supply. A summary of the macro impact is shown i figure 1 below. The
broken curve indicates the period by period budget balance scenario, where lump sum transfers
are calculated so as to keep government debt unchanged relative to the baseline. The solid curve
represents the policy of using public debt to smooth transfers.’
‘Further deta  on the simulations are provided in the tables in the appendix.i

As figure  shows, the increase in the VAT rate raises an amount of revenue equal to approximately
2.2 per cent of GDP in average, annual terms. According to the results in the previous section,
this implies redistribution from the elderly, who have relatively large asset holdings, to future gen-
erations. This shows up in the upward sloping time paths of goods and leisure consumption  that
is, consumption of goods increases during the transition, while labor supply drops reflecting the
wealth effect on hours of work supplied by future generations. However, relative to the baseline,
consumption is lower throughout the transition as households react to the lower after-tax wage rate
by cutting labor supply.
Figure  portrays the dynamic evolution of net foreign assets. As resources are shifted from the
current old towards future generations, the latter react by saving more. Also, the new generations
face lighter tax burdens early in their lives, as their optimal consumption path is upward sloping
and they consequently pay relatively little in consumption taxes, while they benefit from increased
transfers. Thus the VAT and the revenue recycling policy interact to rearrange intertemporally the
net tax burdens faced by the young; accordingly, they save more initially in order to pay higher taxes
later. In a small, open economy setting this shows up as an increase in net foreign assets, as the
supply of domestic securities is unresponsive to demand. Hence, a half-century into the transition
foreign debt has been reduced by 3 to  per cent of base GDP.
Under the unchanged debt policy, i.e. the broken curves in figure 1, the time path of 
distortive transfers directly reflects the time path of tax revenue. As figures le and  shows, tax
revenue increases over time, as the higher stock of foreign assets generates additional revenue from
the taxation of interest income. Hence, the long run impact on consumption, labor supply and asset
demand are all reinforced by this policy. In contrast, when the fiscal authority employs debt policy
to smooth transfers over time, this acts to shift resources back towards survivors from the initial
equilibrium, as these generations now get to share in the long run increase in savings tax revenue.
Notice how savings tax revenue in the constant debt scenario transitionally drops below the level
in the endogenous debt case. This precisely mirrors the upward sloping time path of transfers.
Households thus rationally foresee larger, future income subsidies, and hence choose to accumulate
fewer financial claims. In the long run, however, as this policy is more effective in stimulating long
run asset demand, savings tax revenue is higher.
Notice how the response of consumption and labor supply differs very little between the two
experiments, whereas the outcomes in the longer term deviate more. This is so for two reasons.
First, during the initial phase of the transition, winners and losers under the VAT policy co-exist,
and switching to either of the two budget balance rules benefits one category at the expense of
the other; hence, the differences in macro effects are barely discernible. Second, discounting the
resources of future generations at the market rate of interest implies that, when income is shifted

of 0.55 per cent in private consumption, or roughly 0.35 per cent of GDP. Comparing this to the
welfare effects portrayed in figure 2, it is evident that the purely redistributive elements in the VAT
change are fairly large relative to the efficiency effect. This is a quite common finding in OLG model
simulations of tax policies.
Exogenous labor  To focus on the purely redistributive elements of consumption taxation,
figure 3 shows the macro impact under the assumption of exogenous labor supply.
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Figure 6: The debt policy.
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 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the generational impact of consumption taxes, and illustrated its quanti-
tative importance in an OLG simulation model.
It turned out that consumption taxation redistribute resources across generations by imposing
a one time capital levy on the assets of existing generations and rearranging the time path of net
taxes faced by future generations. In this way, a permanent increase in the rate of VAT may shift
resources away from the current old towards all future generations. This is, however, as much a result
of the way revenue is disbursed as it reflects the incidence of the VAT. The VAT is a proportional
tax on lifetime income, and hence net benefits will accrue to future generations only if they share
disproportionately in the revenue rebating scheme, relative to their share in the consumption tax
base. This underscores the importance of being specific about the differential incidence assumptions
employed in dynamic tax analysis.
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Table la: VAT + 5 percentage points, c.b.c., tau equalization
 dinstc=l
GDP at Priv. Govt. Priv. Current Labor Net savings
Period market prices cons. cons. inv. account rate
(CA**) (level)
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 -0.32 -0.73 -0.73 0.19 -0.33 0.26
2 -0.33 -0.72 -0.70 0.17 -0.33 0.25
3 -0.35 -0.71 -0.68 0.16 -0.34 0.24
4 -0.36 -0.70 -0.67 0.15 -0.34 0.23
5 -0.36 -0.69 -0.65 0.14 -0.34 0.21
6 -0.37 -0.68 -0.64 0.13 -0.35 0.21
7 -0.38 -0.63 0.12 -0.35 0.20
8 -0.39 -0.66 -0.62 0.11 -0.35 0.19
9 -0.39 -0.65 -0.61 0.11 -0.36 0.18
10 -0.40 -0.64 -0.61 0.10 -0.36 0.17
20 -0.42 -0.57 -0.58 0.06 -0.38 0.12
50 -0.44 -0.45 -0.59 0.02 -0.41 0.05
100 -0.45 -0.39 -0.60 0.00 -0.42 0.01
295 -0.45 -0.37 -0.61 0.00 -0.43 0.00
Private financial wealth------ Human After-tax Lump-sum
Period Total Equity Govt. debt Foreign wealth wage rate transfers
0 -0.21 -0.23 0.00 0.00 40.32 0.00 0.000
1 -0.02 -0.24 0.08 0.19 40.29 -3.79 2.170
2 0.16 -0.25 0.13 0.37 40.25 -3.80 2.170
3 0.33 -0.26 0.18 0.53 40.23 -3.82 2.170
4 0.49 -0.26 0.22 0.68 40.20 -3.83 2.170
5 0.65 -0.27 0.27 0.82 40.18 -3.84 2.170
6 0.80 -0.28 0.31 0.96 40.16 -3.85 2.170
7 0.94 -0.28 0.36 1.08 40.15 -3.86 2.170
8 1.07 -0.28 0.40 1.20 40.13 -3.87 2.170
9 1.20 -0.29 0.44 1.31 40.12 -3.88 2.170
10 1.33 -0.29 0.48 1.41 40.11 -3.88 2.170
20 2.35 -0.31 0.81 2.19 40.05 -3.91 2.170
50 3.98 -0.32 1.39 3.32 40.03 -3.92 2.169
100 4.82 -0.33 1.68 3.89 40.03 -3.93 2.170
295 5.06 -0.33 1.79 4.03 40.01 -3.93 2.169
Private sector---- GDP factor prices- Consumption------
Period Output Energy Capital Total Private Total Energy Other
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 -0.33 -0.13 -0.06 -0.26 -0.34 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73
2 -0.36 -0.18 -0.12 -0.28 -0.36 -0.72 -0.72 -0.72
3 -0.38 -0.22 -0.17 -0.29 -0.38 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71
4 -0.40 -0.25 -0.21 -0.31 -0.40 -0.70 -0.70 -0.70
5 -0.41 -0.29 -0.25 -0.32 -0.42 -0.69 -0.69 -0.69
6 -0.43 -0.32 -0.28 -0.33 -0.43 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68
7 -0.44 -0.34 -0.31 -0.34 -0.44 -0.67 -0.67 -0.67
8 -0.45 -0.37 -0.34 -0.35 -0.45 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66
9 -0.46 -0.39 -0.36 -0.35 -0.46 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65
10 -0.47 -0.40 -0.39 -0.36 -0.47 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64
20 -0.53 -0.51 -0.50 -0.40 -0.53 -0.57 -0.57 -0.57
50 -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 -0.44 -0.58 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45
100 -0.60 -0.60 -0.60 -0.46 -0.60 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39
295 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.46 -0.61 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37
All variables except  and  are  change over base case.
 indicates change in level in of base line GDP at mkt. prices.
 do. current  do. 

Table 2a: VAT + 5 percentage points,  Bg constant
Period
(s)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
20
50
100
295
 dinstc=l
GDP at Priv. Govt. Priv. Current Labor Net savings
market prices cons. cons. inv. account rate
(CA**) (L) (level)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.32 -0.75 -0.72 0.20 -0.32 0.18
-0.33 -0.74 -0.69 0.19 -0.33 0.20
-0.34 -0.73 -0.68 0.17 -0.33 0.19
-0.35 -0.72 -0.66 0.16 -0.33 0.18
-0.36 -0.71 -0.65 0.15 -0.34 0.17
-0.37 -0.70 -0.63 0.15 -0.34 0.17
-0.38 -0.69 -0.62 0.14 -0.35 0.16
-0.38 -0.68 -0.62 0.13 -0.35 0.15
-0.39 -0.67 -0.61 0.12 -0.35 0.15
-0.39 -0.66 -0.60 0.12 -0.35 0.14
-0.42 -0.58 -0.58 0.08 -0.38 0.11
-0.45 -0.42 -0.60 0.04 -0.41 0.05
-0.46 -0.30 -0.63 0.01 -0.44 0.02
-0.46 -0.24 -0.65 0.00 -0.45 0.00
Private financial wealth------ Human After-tax Lump-sum
Period Total Equity Govt. debt Foreign wealth wage rate transfers
(s) (A*) (H*)
0 -0.21 -0.23 0.00 0.00 40.01 0.00 0.000
1 -0.08 -0.24 0.00 0.20 40.04 -3.79 2.093
2 0.06 -0.25 0.00 0.39 40.04 -3.81 2.119
3 0.20 -0.26 0.00 0.57 40.05 -3.82 2.122
4 0.33 -0.26 0.00 0.74 40.07 -3.83 2.125
5 0.45 -0.27 0.00 0.89 40.08 -3.84 2.128
6 0.57 -0.27 0.00 1.04 40.10 -3.85 2.130
7 0.69 -0.28 0.00 1.18 40.11 -3.86 2.133
8 0.80 -0.28 0.00 1.32 40.13 -3.87 2.136
9 0.90 -0.28 0.00 1.44 40.15 -3.88 2.138
10 1.01 -0.29 0.00 1.56 40.17 -3.88 2.140
20 1.87 -0.31 0.00 2.53 40.39 -3.91 2.161
50 3.48 -0.33 0.00 4.22 40.92 -3.92 2.204
100 4.64 -0.35 0.00 5.43 41.33 -3.93 2.236
295 5.25 -0.36 0.00 6.07 41.55 -3.93 2.253
Period
(s)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
20
50
100
295
Private sector---- 
output Energy Capital
0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.33 -0.13 -0.06
-0.35 -0.17 -0.12
-0.37 -0.21 -0.17
-0.39 -0.25 -0.21
-0.41 -0.28 -0.25
-0.42 -0.31 -0.28
-0.43 -0.34 -0.31
-0.44 -0.36 -0.34
-0.46 -0.38 -0.36
-0.46 -0.40 -0.38
-0.53 -0.51 -0.50
-0.59 -0.59 -0.59
-0.63 -0.63 -0.63
-0.65 -0.65 -0.65
GDP factor prices- 
Total Private
0.00 0.00
-0.26 -0.34
-0.27 -0.36
-0.29 -0.38
-0.30 -0.40
-0.31 -0.41
-0.32 -0.42
-0.33 -0.44
-0.34 -0.45
-0.35 -0.46
-0.36 -0.47
-0.40 -0.53
-0.45 -0.59
-0.48 -0.63
-0.49 -0.65
Consumption------
Total Energy Other
0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.75 -0.75 -0.75
-0.74 -0.74 -0.74
-0.73 -0.73 -0.73
-0.72 -0.72 -0.72
-0.71 -0.71 -0.71
-0.70 -0.70 -0.70
-0.69 -0.69 -0.69
-0.68 -0.68 -0.68
-0.67 -0.67 -0.67
-0.66 -0.66 -0.66
-0.58 -0.58 -0.58
-0.42 -0.42 -0.42
-0.30 -0.30 -0.30
-0.24 -0.24 -0.24
All variables except  and  are  change over base case.
indicates change in level in  of base line GDP at mkt. prices.
 do. current  do. 

Table 3a: VAT + 5 percentage points, exog. L, tau equalization
 dtw=l  dinstc=l
GDP at Priv. Govt. Priv. Current Labor Net savings
Period market prices cons. cons. inv. account rate
(CA**) (L) (level)
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 -0.03 -0.21 0.09 -0.00 0.26
2 -0.03 -0.20 0.09 -0.00 0.25
3 -0.02 -0.19 0.09 -0.00 0.24
4 -0.02 -0.17 0.09 -0.00 0.23
5 -0.02 -0.16 0.08 -0.00 0.23
6 -0.02 -0.14 0.08 -0.00 0.22
7 -0.02 -0.13 0.08 -0.00 0.21
a -0.02 -0.12 0.08 -0.00 0.21
9 -0.01 -0.11 0.07 -0.00 0.20
10 -0.01 -0.10 0.07 -0.00 0.20
20 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.00 0.14
50 0.02 0.17 0.02 -0.00 0.06
100 0.03 0.27 0.00 -0.00 0.01
295 0.04 0.30 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Period
(s)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
a
9
10
20
50
100
295
Total
(A*)
0.19
0.37
0.54
0.71
0.87
1.03
1.19
1.34
1.48
1.63
2.83
4.88
5.98
6.30
Private financial wealth------ Human After-tax Lump-sum
Equity Govt. debt Foreign wealth wage rate transfers
(H*)
-0.00 0.00 0.00 44.63 0.00 0.000
-0.00 0.09 0.10 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 0.17 0.19 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 0.26 0.28 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 0.37 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 0.42 0.46 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 0.49 0.54 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 0.57 0.62 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 0.64 0.70 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 0.71 0.78 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 0.78 0.85 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 1.35 1.48 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 2.33 2.55 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 2.85 3.12 44.63 -3.93 2.419
-0.00 2.97 3.33 44.67 -3.93 2.422
--Private sector---- -GDP factor prices- -----Consumption------
Period Output Energy Capital Total Private Total Energy Other
(s)
0
1 -0.00 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21
2 -0.00 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20
3 -0.00 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19
4 -0.00 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17
5 -0.00 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
6 -0.00 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14
7
-0.00 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
a -0 .00 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
9 -0 .00 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
10 -0.00 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
20 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 -0.00 0.17 0.17 0.17
100 -0.00 0.27 0.27 0.27
295 -0.00 0.30 0.30 0.30
 variables except  and  are  change over base case.
indicates change in level in  of base line GDP at mkt. prices.
 do. current  do. 

Table 4a: VAT + 5 percentage points, exog. L, Bg constant
Period
(s)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 0
20
50
100
295
Period
(s)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 0
20
50
100
295
 dtc=l  dinstc=l
GDP at Priv. Govt. Priv. Current Labor
market prices cons. cons. inv. account
(I) (CA**)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.03 -0.26 -0.00 0.11 -0.00
-0.03 -0.24 -0.00 0.11 -0.00
-0.03 -0.23 -0.00 0.11 -0.00
-0.03 -0.22 -0.00 0.11 -0.00
-0.03 -0.20 -0.00 0.11 -0.00
-0.02 -0.19 -0.00 0.10 -0.00
-0.02 -0.17 -0.00 0.10 -0.00
-0.02 -0.16 -0.00 0.10 -0.00
-0.02 -0.15 -0.00 0.10 -0.00
-0.02 -0.13 -0.00 0.10 -0.00
-0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.08 -0.00
0.03 0.23 -0.00 0.05 -0.00
0.06 0.45 -0.00 0.02 -0.00
0.08 0.60 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
Private financial wealth------ Human After-tax Lump-sum
Total Equity Govt. debt Foreign wealth wage rate transfers
(A*) (H*) (TAU*)
44.09 0.00 0.000
0.12 -0.00 0.00 0.12 44.16 -3.93 2.324
0.23 -0.00 0.00 0.23 44.22 -3.93 2.329
0.35 -0.00 0.00 0.35 44.28 -3.93 2.333
0.46 -0.00 0.00 0.46 44.34 -3.93 2.338
0.57 -0.00 0.00 0.57 44.41 -3.93 2.342
0.67 -0.00 0.00 0.67 44.47 -3.93 2.347
0.78 -0.00 0.00 0.78 44.52 -3.93 2.351
0.88 -0.00 0.00 0.88 44.58 -3.93 2.355
0.98 -0.00 0.00 0.98 44.64 -3.93 2.360
1.08 -0.00 0.00 1.08 44.69 -3.93 2.364
2.00 -0.00 0.00 2.00 45.20 -3.93 2.401
3.94 -0.00 0.00 3.94 46.30 -3.93 2.480
5.57 -0.00 0.00 5.57 47.22 -3.93 2.547
6.75 -0.00 0.00 6.75 47.88 -3.93 2.595
Net savings
rate
(level)
0.00
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.12
0.07
-Private sector---- -GDP factor prices- -----Consumption------
Period Output Energy Capital Total Private Total Energy Other
(s) (Ei)
a
10
20
50
100
295
-0.26 -0.26 -0.26
-0.24 -0.24 -0.24
-0.23 -0.23 -0.23
-0.22 -0.22 -0.22
-0.20 -0.20 -0.20
-0.19 -0.19 -0.19
-0.17 -0.17 -0.17
-0.16 -0.16 -0.16
-0.15 -0.15 -0.15
-0.13 -0.13 -0.13
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02
0.23 0.23 0.23
0.45 0.45 0.45
0.60 0.60 0.60
All variables except  and  are  change over base case.
indicates change in level in  of base line GDP at mkt. prices.
 do. current  do. 
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